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In this article, Professor Caldwell reviews the history and characteristics of the juvenile court,
noting the important trends and significant variations that have marked the court's development.
In addition, he presents and assesses the principal criticisms which have been leveled at the court's
philosophy and operation. Concluding with several proposals concerning the future of the court,
Professor Caldwell calls for a reconsideration of certain basic questions, including these: (1) To
what extent should the court subordinate its potential as a moral agency in order to serve as a treat-
ment center? (2) To what extent should the court embrace not only judicial functions but social
service functions as well? (3) How far ought the court go in denying traditional legal safeguards to
the juveniles and their parents in order to maintain an informal procedure and atmosphere and protect
the juvenile from being marked as a criminal?
The author prepared this article at the special request of the Board of Editors in commemoration
of the Journal's fifty years of publication.-EDrroR.
On July 1, 1899, the first juvenile court in the
world' began its legal existence in Chicago, Illi-
nois.2 This event has been widely acclaimed as a
revolutionary advance in the treatment of de-
linquent and neglected children and as the
beginning of a new era in the cooperation of law,
science, and social work in the field of child welfare.
In fact, according to some writers, it foreshadows
1 There is some difference of opinion as to whether
the first juvenile court was established in the United
States. It is said, for example, that children's courts
were introduced by ministerial order in South Australia
in 1889, and later legalized under a state act in 1895,
but it is generally agreed that the United States should
be given credit for having the first real juvenile court.
There is also some dispute as to whether Chicago, Illi-
nois, or Denver, Colorado, had the first juvenile court
in the United States, but preference is generally given
to Chicago, since the law approved in Colorado on
April 12, 1899, was essentially a truancy law although
it did contain some of the features of a juvenile court
law. See Lou, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES
13-23 (1927); Lindsey, Colorado's Contribution to the
Juvenile Court, THE CHILD, THE CLINIC, AND THE
COURT 274-89 (Addams ed. 1925); CLARKE, SOCIL
LEGISLATION 375-77 (1957).
2 For easy reference to the first juvenile court act, see
2 ABBOTT, THE CHILD AND THE STATE 392-401 (1938).
the time when all offenders, both juvenile and
adult, will be treated individually through scien-
tific and case work processes instead of punished
by the methods of criminal law.3
LEGAL ROOTS OF THE COURT
The juvenile court owes a great deal to American
ingenuity and enterprise, but it also has legal
roots that can be traced back to principles that
are deeply embedded in English jurisprudence.
These principles are to be found in the differential
treatment which was given to children by the
English courts through the application of com-
mon law and equity doctrines for the protection
of innocence and dependency.
One of the legal roots of the juvenile court is the
principle of equity or chancery that originated
because of the rigidity of the common law and its
Lou, op. cit. supra note 1, at 2; Pound, The Juvenile
Court and the Law, YEARBOO, 1944, 1-22 (Nat'l Prob.
Ass'n, 1945); Chute, Fifty Years of the Juvenile Court,
YEARBOOK, 1949, 1-20 (Nat'l Prob. & Parole Ass'n,
1950); Winnet, Fifty Years of the Juvenile Court: An
Evaluation, 36 A.B.A.J. 363-66 (1950).
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failure to provide adequate remedies in deserving
cases. Eventually the chancellor, who was the
head of England's judicial system, was held
responsible for giving greater flexibility to the
law in such cases and for balancing the interests of
litigants in a more equitable manner as measured
by the merits of the individual case. Since equity
was thus dispensed by the Council of Chancery,
the terms "equity" and "chancery" came to be
used interchangeably. Through this system of
equity the king acted as parens patriae, or as
"father of his country," in exercising his power of
guardianship over the persons and property of
minors, who were considered wards of the state
and as such entitled to special protection. Al-
though originally equity was used chiefly to
protect dependent or neglected children who had
property interests, its action prefigured the pro-
tective intervention of the state through the in-
strumentality of the juvenile court in cases of
delinquency.
The other legal root of the juvenile court is the
presumption of innocence thrown about children
by the common law. According to its doctrines a
child under the age of seven is conclusively pre-
sumed incapable of entertaining criminal intent
and therefore of committing a crime. Between the
ages of seven and fourteen, a child is presumed to
be incapable of committing a crime, but the
presumption may be rebutted by showing that
the offender has enough intelligence to know the
nature of his act. After the age of fourteen, chil-
dren, like adults, are presumed to be responsible
for their actions. Thus the creation of the juvenile
court involved the extension of the principle that
children below a certain age cannot be held crim-
inally responsible-a principle that has a long his-
tory in the common law.
4
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE COURT
In America, where English jurisprudence was
introduced by the early colonists, such tendencies
as the increase in the complexity of social relation-
ships, the growth of humanitarianism, and the
rise of the social sciences contributed to the ex-
pansion of the area in which the child received
differential treatment by law.5 Thus in order to
4 Lou, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1-12; CL.ARKE, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 372-74; SUSStAN, LAW OF JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY 15, 16 (1959); Pound, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 4-8. See also Pound, The Rise of Socialized
Criminal Justice, YEARBOOK, 1942, 1-22 (Nat'l Prob.
Ass'n, 1942).
CALDWELL, CRIMINOLOGY 360 (1956).
protect children from confinement in jails and
prisons, institutions for juvenile offenders were
opened in New York in 1825, in Boston in 1826,
and in Philadelphia in 1828. Gradually such
institutions were constructed in other parts of the
country. The foster-home movement, originating
in New York in 1853 with the establishment of the
Children's Aid Society, which specialized in the
placement of destitute and deserted children,
soon spread to other states. Chicago as early as
1861 provided for a commission to hear and de-
termine petty cases of boys from 6 to 17. Suffolk
County (Boston) in 1870 and New York in 1877
instituted separate hearings for children, and then
in 1892 New York created separate dockets and
records as well as separate trials for juveniles
under 16. By the enactment of a statute in 1869,
Massachusetts stipulated that an agent of the
State Board of Charities should attend the trials
of children, protect their interests, and make
recommendations regarding them to the judge.
Between 1878 and 1898 Massachusetts established
a state-wide system of probation and thus initi-
ated a movement that eventually carried this
method of correction into every state in the
United States. The years of the nineteenth century
also saw the enactment of laws for the regulation
of child labor, the development of special services
for handicapped children, and the growth of pub-
lic education.6
As this brief summary of some of the important
changes in the field of child welfare indicates,
there was a growing acceptance of public re-
sponsibility for the protection and care of children,
but as yet there was no legal machinery by which
juvenile offenders could be handled, not as crim-
inals according to the regular procedure of the
criminal court, but as wards of the state who were
in need of special care, protection, and treatment.
Meanwhile, however, Chicago welfare and civic
organizations, notably the Chicago Woman's
Club and the Catholic Visitation and Aid Society,
were setting the stage for the appearance of
exactly this kind of machinery. As a result of their
persistent agitation, a spirited campaign was
begun for the establishment of a juvenile court,
6 Chute, op. cit. supra note 3, at 2, 3; SussmAmq, op.
cit. supra note 4, at 11-14; TEETERS & REINEMANN.
THE CHALLENGE OF DELINQUENcY 282-86 (1950);
TAPPAN, COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF JUVENILE DELLN-
QUENCY (Part I, North America) 14-16 (United Nations
Department of Economics and Social Affairs, 1958);
BLOCK & FLINN, DELINQUENCY: THE JUVENILE OF-
FENDER IN AMERICA TODAY 307-12 (1956).
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and under the leadership of such organizations as
the State Board of Charities and the Chicago Bar
Association, this campaign was eventually suc-
cessful in creating the world's first juvenile court.7
An examination of the historical background of
this court shows that many varied influences
helped to produce the climate in which it had its
origin. In fact, its establishment may well be
considered a logical and exceedingly imnortant
development in a much broader movement for the
expansion of the specialized treatment given to
children in an increasingly complex society. Al-
though the idea of the juvenile court combined
the already existing elements of institutional
segregation, probation supervision, foster-home
placement, separate judicial hearings, and an
approach that emphasized the rehabilitation of the
juvenile offender, even so, as Tappan explains, it
did constitute a significant achievement in judicial
integration by providing for a more systematic and
independent handling of children's cases.8
THE FIRsT JUVENILE COURT
The Juvenile Court of Cook County, the first of
its kind in the world, was established in Chicago
by a state law approved on July 1, 1899. This
law, entitled "An Act to Regulate the Treatment
and Control of Dependent, Neglected, and De-
linquent Children," provided for the establishment
of a juvenile court in all counties with a population
of over 500,000, but since only Cook County had a
population of that size, it alone received such a
court. In other counties circuit and county courts
were to handle cases arising under the law. The
juvenile court was given jurisdiction over chil-
dren under the age of 16 years who were adjudged
to be dependent, neglected, or delinquent, and it
was to have a special judge (chosen by the circuit
court judges from among their number at such
times as they should determine), a separate court
room, separate records, and an informal procedure,
which meant that such important parts of the
criminal court trial as the indictment, pleadings,
and jury (unless the jury was demanded by an
interested party or ordered by the judge) were to
be eliminated. A summons, unless it proved to be
7 Lathrop, The Background of the Juvenile Court in
Illinois, and Hurley, Origin of the Illinois Juvenile
Court Law, THE CHrL, THE CLINIC, AND THE COURT
290-97, 320-30 (Addams ed. 1925); 2 ABBOTT, op. Cit.
supra note 2, at 330, 331; Chute, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 3, 4; Lou, op. cit. supra note 1, at 20, 21; SussMAN,
op. cit. supra note-4, at 13, 14.8T.I'PAN, op. cit. supra note 6. at 14, 15.
ineffectual, was to be used instead of a warrant in
all cases, and the court was given authority to
appoint probation officers, who were to serve
without compensation. The juvenile court act was
to be construed liberally so that the care, custody,
and the discipline of the child should approximate
as nearly as possible that which should be given by
his parents.9
If one bears in mind the following facts about
the first juvenile court law, it may help him to
acquire a better perspective of the juvenile court
movement in the United States:
1. The first court was not to be a new or inde-
pendent tribunal but merely a special jurisdiction
in the circuit court.
2. The juvenile court was to be a special court
and not an administrative agency. As Dean
Pound has said, "It was set up as a court of equity,
with the administrative functions incidental to
equity jurisdiction, not as a criminal court, and
not, as might have happened later, as an ad-
ministrative agency with incidental adjudicating
functions." 0
3. The law did not stipulate that juvenile
delinquents should be "treated" and not punished.
It merely provided that the child should receive
approximately the same care, custody, and disci-
pline that his parents should give to him."
4. A juvenile delinquent was simply defined as
"any child under the age of 16 years who violates
any law of this State or any city or village ordi-
nance. " 12
5. In all trials under the law any interested
party might demand, or the judge might order, a
jury of six to try the case.'
In effect, then, the first juvenile court law
established the status of delinquency as "some-
thing less than crime."1 In doing this it made two
fundamental changes in the handling of juvenile
offenders that are especially noteworthy. First, it
raised the age below which a child could not be a
criminal from seven to sixteen and made a child
who was alleged to be delinquent subject to the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Secondly, it
placed the operation of the court under equity or
chancery jurisdiction and thereby extended the
application of the principle of guardianship, which
9 2 ABBOTT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 392-401.
1o PouND, op. cit. supra note 3, at 5.
1 2 ABBOTT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 400, 401.
12 Id. at 393.
11 Ibid.
'1 TAPPAN, op. cit. supra note 6. at 14.
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had been used to protect neglected and dependent
children, to all children, including juvenile de-
linquents, who were in need of protection by the
state. These two changes, in modified form, remain
as essential characteristics of all juvenile court
legislation.l-
TRENDS IN THE JUVENILE COURT MOVEMENT
Geographical Expansion. After Illinois had taken
the initiative, other states soon followed her
example and established juvenile courts. In fact,
within ten years twenty states and the District of
Columbia enacted juvenile court laws. By 1920 all
except three states had done so, and in 1945, when
Wyoming took action, the list of states having
juvenile court laws was finally complete. Today
all states, the District of Columbia,' 6 and Puerto
Rico have some kind of juvenile court legislation,
7
and the movement has had considerable success
in other countries.
Jurisdictional Extension. While the juvenile court
movement was spreading, the jurisdiction of the
court itself was being extended. In general, the
definition of juvenile delinquency was broadened,
and the types of nondelinquency cases (such as
those involving illegitimacy, mental and physical
defectives, etc.) under the jurisdiction of the court
were increased. Furthermore, the tendency was to
raise the upper age level of the children subject to
the authority of the court from 16 to 17 or 18,
and for some cases in a few states, to 21. In addi-
tion, the juvenile court was given jurisdiction over
adults in certain cases involving children-for
example, in cases in which an adult had con-
tributed to the delinquency of a juvenile.1 9
15 CALDWELL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 360, 361.
16 There are no federal juvenile courts. Children
under 18 who violate a federal law not punishable by
death or life imprisonment may be transferred to a
state juvenile court or proceeded against as juvenile de-
linquents in a federal district court. SUSSMAN, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 76.
'7 SUSSMAN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 15, 65-76; CALD-
WELL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 361.
18 See SMITH, JUVENILE COURT LAWS IN FOREIGN
COUNTRIES (U. S. Children's Bureau Publication No.
328, Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing
Office, 1951); CLAREE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 377-83;
INT'L COM. OF THE HOWARD LEAGUE FOR PENAL RE-
FORM, LAWLESS YOUTH: A CHALLENGE TO THE NEW
EUROPE (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.,
1947); WATSON, BRITISH JUVENILE COURTS (London:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1948); Henriques, Child-
ren's Courts in England, 37 J. CRIM. L. & C. 295 (1946);
Sellin, Sweden's Substitute of the Juvenile Court, 261
ANNALS 137 (Jan. 1949); Pihlblad, The Juvenile Of-
fender in Norway, 46 J. CRiM. L., C.&P.S. 500 (1955).
'9 CALDWELL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 361.
Increase in Court's Influence. Then, too, after the
creation of the juvenile court, it began to exert an
increasing influence on the principles and methods
used in the adjustment of many other family
problems and in the handling of adolescent and
adult offenders. For example, some cities, like
Cincinnati, Philadelphia, and Wilmington, Dela-
ware, established special courts, called family or
domestic relations courts, with jurisdiction over
cases involving all kinds of family problems, such
as delinquency, dependency, neglect, adoption,
illegitimacy, nonsupport, and crimes by members
of a family against one another. In effect, the
operation of these courts means that many of the
principles and methods of the juvenile court are
being applied to an increasing variety of social
problems. Moreover, special courts for adol-
lescents have been set up in certain cities, like
Chicago, Philadelphia, and New York, in which
an attempt is being made to combine some of the
principles and methods of the juvenile court with
those of the criminal court in proceedings against
youthful offenders who arc above the juvenile
court age but below the age of twenty-one. A
much more systematic and inclusive program for
dealing with this type of offender is represented
by the various youth authorities that have been
created in such states as California and Minne-
sota. In their emphasis upon individual diagnosis
and treatment these programs, too, reflect to some
extent the spreading influence of the philosophy
of the juvenile court. Finally, it may be said that
this influence can also be seen in the use of pre-
sentence investigation and probation in the cases
of adult offenders in our criminal courts.-
The increasing complexity of American society
has contributed significantly to these trends in
the juvenile court movement. Such interrelated
factors as industrialization, urbanization, the un-
2No attempt will be made in this article to discuss
the development of family and adolescent courts and
the various youth authorities. However, a considerable
bibliography about these subjects now exists. See for
example, TEETERS & REINEMANN, op. cit. supra note 6,
at 344-83, 762-65; BLocK & FLYNN, op. cit. supra note
6, at 459-507; CALDWELL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 378-
85; TAPPAN, DELINQUENT GIRLS IN COURT (1947);
BECK, FIVE STATES (1951); LUDWIG, YOUTH AND THE
LAW (1955); Tappan, The Young Adult Offender under
the A inerican Law Institute's Model Penal Code, 19 FED.
PROS. 20 (Dec. 1955); Youngdahl, Give the Youth Cor-
rections Program a Chance, 20 FED. PROB. 3 (March,
1956); Tappan, Young Adults under the Youth Author-
ity, 47 J. CIMH. L., C.&P.S. 629 (1957); Melson, De-




precedented movement of populations, the amaz-
ig utilization of natural resources, the rapid
accumulation of inventions and discoveries, and
the acceleration of transportation and communi-
cation have tended to undermine the family and
the neighborhood and, forcing our communities
to find additional sources of social control, have
given considerable impetus to the establishment
of juvenile courts and sent into them an increasing
number and variety of cases. In the meantime,
other influences have more specifically affected
the philosophy and methods of the juvenile
court. Thus social workers, under the aggressive
leadership of such organizations as the United
States Children's Bureau, the National Probation
and Parole Association, and various other associa-
tions now united into the National Association of
Social Workers, have joined with psychiatrists in
stressing the importance of case work training
and treatment services in the operation of the
juvenile court, and the efforts of a comparatively
few well-organized, big-city juvenile courts at
conventions and conferences have served to focus
and intensify these influences. The resulting tend-
ency has been to picture juvenile delinquency
as symptomatic of some underlying emotional
condition, which must be diagnosed by means of
the concepts and techniques of psychiatry, psy-
chology, and social work, and for which treatment,
not punishment, must be administered through
the efforts of a team of psychiatrists, psychol-
ogists, and social workers. Surprisingly enough,
the legal profession, also, has contributed to this
tendency through important court decisions re-
garding the juvenile court that have, stressed
its social service functions and minimized its
legal characteristics. The total effect of all this
has been to place increasing emphasis on the treat-
ment of the individual and to give decreasing
attention to his legal rights and the security of
the community. Thus the balance between rights,
on the one hand, and duties and responsibilities,
on the other, which every court must seek to
maintain, has been upset as the juvenile court
has been pushed more and more into the role of a
social work agency.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JUVENILE COURT
Although the juvenile court has had an uneven
development and has manifested a great diversity
in its methods and procedures, nevertheless, cer-
tain characteristics have appeared which are
considered essential in its operation. As early as
1920, Evelina Belden of the United States Chil-
dren's Bureau listed the following as the essential
characteristics of the juvenile court: (1) separate
hearings for children's cases, (2) informal or
chancery procedure, (3) regular probation service,
(4) separate detention of children, (5) special
court and probation records, and (6) provision for
mental and physical examinations -.2  Of course,
many so-called juvenile courts have few of these
characteristics, and others possess them in varying
degrees. However, in the opinion of many ob-
servers, if a court does not have them, it cannot
claim to be a juvenile court.
A few years ago, Katharine Lenroot, then chief
of the United States Children's Bureau, pre-
sented a summary of standards for the juvenile
court which indicate the characteristics that many
now believe the court should have. 'these standards
call for the following:
1. Broad jurisdiction in cases of children under
eighteen years of age requiring court action or
protection because of their acts or circumstances.
2. A judge chosen because of his special quali-
fications for juvenile court work, with legal
training, acquaintance with social problems, and
understanding of child psychology.
3. Informal court procedure and private
hearings.
4. Detention kept at a minimum, outside of
jails and police stations and as far as possible in
private boarding homes.
5. A well-qualified probation staff, with limita-
tion of case loads, and definite plans for con-
structive work in each case.
6. Availability of resources for individual and
specialized treatment such as medical, psycho-
logical, and psychiatric services, foster family and
institutional care, and recreational services and
facilities.
7. State supervision of probation work.
8. An adequate record system, providing for
both legal and social records and for the safe-
guarding of these records from indiscriminate
public inspection.Y
These standards form much of the basis of the
Standard Juvenile Court Act, the latest edition of
2 1 
BELDIN, COURTS L THE UNITED STATES HEARING
CHnEREN'S CASES 7-10 (U. S. Children's Bureau Pub-
lication No. 65, Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1920).
2 Lenroot, The Jvrenile Court Today, 13 FED.
PROB. 10 (Sept. 1949).
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which was issued by the National Probation and
Parole Association in 1959,23 and to a great extent
they have been incorporated in the Standards for
Specialized Courts Dealing with Children, which
was prepared by the United States Children's
Bureau in 1954.2
4
THn PRESENT STATUS OF THE COURT
In the United States the juvenile court varies
greatly from one jurisdiction to another, mani-
festing at present all stages of its complex develop-
ment. And it should not be overlooked that its
philosophy, structure, and functions are still in
the process of evolution. Rarely is the court a
distinct and highly specialized one, and in the
more rural counties it is largely of a rudimentary
nature. Usually it is part of a court with more
general jurisdiction, the judges holding sessions
for juveniles at regular or irregular intervals.
25
Since there is this great diversity, no simple
description of the juvenile courts of the United
States can be given. However, it is possible to
indicate in general terms their present status with
respect to certain important features.
Philosophy of the Court. In the words of Tappan,
the juvenile court and its methods are "by no
means a mere direct borrowing from chancery and
common law," but, on the contrary, have emerged
largely from "the philosophy and techniques of
modern case-work and, more particularly, the
ideologies of the child-welfare movement con-
cerning the rights of children and the devices that
should be used to meet their needs." In fact,
"the operations of the specialized juvenile court
reflect the contemporary impact of casework
oriented probation officers, administrative social
agency procedures, and other non-legal (if not
distinctly anti-legal) forces far more than they
23 A STANDARD JUVENILE COURT ACT (rev. ed.; New
York: Nat'l Prob. and Parole Ass'n, 1959). This act is
the product of the efforts of the National Probation
and Parole Association and the United States Child-
ren's Bureau together with others who want to promote
greater uniformity and higher standards in the juvenile
courts of America. Its various editions have been pub-
lished in the hope that they might be used as models in
the preparation and amendment of state laws. For the
provisions of the 1959 edition of this act and comments
on its various sections see 5 NAT'L PROB. AND PAROLE
ASS'N JOUR. 323-91 (1959).2 4
STANDARDS FOR SPECIALIZED COURTS DEALING
WITH CHILDREN (U. S. Children's Bureau Publication
No. 346, Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Print-
ing Office, 1954).
25 TAPPAN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 15, 24.
do the influence of either chancery or common
law, modern or ancient."26
Although generalizations about anything as
complex as the juvenile court are always haz-
ardous, it appears that the following are important
elements in the court's philosophy:
(1) The Superior Rights of the State. The state is
the "higher or ultimate parent" of all the children
within its borders. The rights of the child's own
parents are always subject to the control of the
state when in the opinion of the court the best
interests of the child demand it. If the state has
to intervene in the case of any child, it exercises
its power of guardianship over the child and
provides him with the protection, care, and guid-
ance that he needs. This is an adaptation of the
ancient doctrine of parens patriae, by which all
English children were made wards of the Crown.
-7
(2) Individualization of Justice. A basic principle
in the philosophy of the juvenile court is the
recognition that people are different and that each
must be considered in the light of his own back-
ground and personality. The court, therefore,
must adapt its actions to the circumstances of the
individual case by ascertaining the needs and
potentialities of the child and coordinating the
knowledge and skills of law, science, and social
work for the promotion of his welfare. This means
the balancing of interests in an equitable manner
by administrative rather than adversary methods
within a flexible procedure such as that provided
by chancery. Dean Pound has called this "indi-
vidualized justice." 28
(3) The Status of Delinquency. The state should
try to protect the child from the harmful brand of
criminality. In order to accomplish this the law
26 Id. at 9. There is a difference of opinion regarding
the extent to which the principles of equity and the
criminal law contributed to the origin of the juvenile
court. See Mack, Legal Problems Involved in the Estab-
lishient of the Juvenile Court, THE DELINQUENT CHILD
AND THE HoME 181 (Breckinridge & Abbott ed. 1912);
POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 134, 135
(1923); S. & E. T. Glueck, Historical and Legislative
Background of the Juvenile Court, THE PROBLEM OF
DELINQUENCY 258, 259 (Glueck ed. 1959); Lou, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 2-7.
27 Mack, op. cit. supra note 26, at 181-87; Lou, op.
cit. supra note 1, at 2-9; Schramm, Philosophy of the
Juvenile Court, 261 ANNALS 101 (June 1949).
28 Pound, The Future of Socialized Justice, YEAR-
BOOK, 1946, 6 (Nat'l Prob. Ass'n 1947); Schramm, op.
cit. supra note 27, at 103, 104; Lou, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 2-5; BLOCK & FLYNN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 317,
318; STANDARDS FOR SPECIALIZED COURTS DEALING
WITH CHILDREN. op. cit. supra note 24, at 1, 2.
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created the status of delinquency, which is some-
thing less than crime and is variously defined in
different states. However, this still does not
satisfy some students of the court who advocate
the removal of even the "delinquency tag," which
they claim is just another harmful label, and
assert that delinquency acts have no significance
except as symptoms of conditions that demand
investigation by the court.29
(4) Noncriminal Procedure. By means of an
informal procedure the juvenile court functions
in such a way as to give primary consideration to
the interests of the child. In general the courts
have held that the procedure of the juvenile
court is not criminal in nature since its purpose
is not to convict the child of a crime, but to
protect, aid, and guide him, and that, therefore,
it is not unconstitutional if it denies him certain
rights which are guaranteed to an adult in a
criminal trial."
(5) Remedial, Preventive, and Nonpunitive Purpose.
The action of the juvenile court is to save the
child and to prevent him from becoming a criminal.
It seeks to provide him with about the same care
and protection that his parents should give him.
Although, as we have explained, the first juvenile
court law did not stipulate that the child should
not be punished, many subsequent court decisions
and most of the literature on the subject insist
that the substitution of treatment for punishment
is an essential element in the philosophy of the
court.3'
Geographical Area Served by the Court. The county
is the geographical area served by most juvenile
courts in the United States, but for some the
jurisdictional unit is the town, the city, the
borough, or the judicial district. Since the county
is the conventional unit of state government and
of many private organizations, its use as the
29 Mack, op. cit. supra note 26, at 189; Sussex-w, op.
cit. supra note 4, at 20; TAPPAN, op. cit. supra note 6,
at 14, 15.
30 CLAR.E, op. cit. supra note 1, at 410; Lou, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 10. For a convenient digest of some of
the important cases regarding the constitutionality of
the juvenile court, see THE PROBLEm OF DELINQUENCY
334-506 (Glueck ed. 1959).
31 Mack, op. cit. supra note 26, at 190; INT'L Coav. OF
THE HoWARD LEAGUE FOR PENviL R.EFORM, op. cit.
supra note 18, at 9-21; STANDARDS FOR SPECIALIZED
CouRTs DEALING WITH CHILDREN, op. cit. supra note
24, at 1; Chute, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1; Lou, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 7; Hurley. op. cit. supra note 7, at 328;
CLARKE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 410-15.
jurisdictional area for the court has obvious
advantages in the coordination of the court's
work with that of other agencies interested in
child welfare. However, most counties cannot
afford to maintain courts at modern standards,
and even if they could, the volume of work would
not justify the necessary expense. In some states
this problem could be solved by making the area
served by the juvenile court the same as the
judicial district served by other courts in the state
and thereby enable one juvenile court to take
care of the cases of two or more counties. Utah,
Connecticut, and Rhode Island have pushed
beyond this and, establishing state systems of
juvenile courts, have created larger jurisdictional
districts within their borders.n
Types of Juvenile Courts. There are about 3000
juvenile courts in the United States, although
actually many are only slightly different from
criminal courts. In referring to the inferior quality
of many juvenile courts, Lowell Carr has said,
"In well over 2000 counties in the United States
nobody has ever seen a well-staffed, modem
juvenile court in action.""4 Even New York City,
a wealthy community with relatively high welfare
standards, has fallen considerably short of the
ideal level of performance set for the juvenile
court.
35
Juvenile courts in the United States may be
classified into these three types: (1) "designated
courts," such as municipal, county, district, and
circuit courts which have been selected or desig-
nated to hear children's cases and while so func-
tioning are called juvenile courts; (2) independent
and separate courts whose administration is
entirely divorced from other courts; and (3)
coordinated courts, which are coordinated with
other special courts such as domestic relations or
family courts. The great majority of the juvenile
courts are "designated courts," and even many
of the separate and independent ones are presided
over by judges from other courts so that their
"I Carr, Most Courts Have To Be Substandard, 13
FED. PROB. 29 (Sept. 1949).
13 SussumA, op. cit. supra note 4, at 25; Larson,
Utah's State-Wide Juvenile Court Plan, 13 FED. PROB.
15 (June, 1949).
14 Carr, op. cit. supra note 32, at 31. See also Dobbs,
Realism and the Juvenile Court, 31 Focus 104 (July,
1952).
35 TAPPAN, op. cit. supra note 6. at 15, 16. For a care-
ful study of New Yorks juvenile courts. see KAII, A
COURT FOR CHILDREN (1953).
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separateness and independence may be more
nominal than real.36
Jurisdiction of the Court. All juvenile courts have
jurisdiction in delinquency cases, and almost all
of them have jurisdiction in cases of dependency
and neglect as well. In addition, some have
authority to handle other problems such as
feeble-mindedness, adoptions, illegitimacy, and
guardianship. Although the definition of de-
linquency varies from state to state, in most
states the violation of a state law or municipal
ordinance (an act which in the case of an adult
would be a crime) is the main category of de-
linquency. Yet in all states delinquency is more
than this, including such items as habitual truancy,
incorrigibility, waywardness, and association with
immoral persons.
Juvenile court laws differ also with respect to
the age of the children over whom the court has
jurisdiction. The laws of most states do not
specify any lower age limit, merely providing
that children under a certain age are subject to
the jurisdiction of the court. Most states make
eighteen the upper age limit; some set it at sixteen
or seventeen; and a few put it as high as twenty-
one. In some states the upper age limit differs
according to the sex of the child. Many states
permit the juvenile court, after it has once ac-
quired jurisdiction over the child, to retain juris-
diction until he has reached twenty-one.
In many states the juvenile court does not have
exclusive jurisdiction over all delinquency cases
but has only concurrent jurisdiction with the
criminal court, delinquency cases being handled
by either court. Often, however, such concurrent
jurisdiction is limited by law to cases of children
above a specified age or to cases involving certain
offenses or to certain counties. Furthermore, in
many states certain offenses, for example, murder,
manslaughter and rape, are entirely excluded from
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, and in these
states children charged with such offenses are
tried in the criminal court.
The jurisdiction of the court is affected in still
another way by the provision in most states that
it may exercise authority over adults in certain
cases involving children. Thus in many states
the juvenile court may require a parent to con-
tribute to the support of his child, or it may try
3 6 TEETERS & REINEMANN, op. cit. supra note 6, at
295-97.
adults charged with contributing to the delin-
quency, neglect, or dependency of a child.37
The Judge and the Probation Officer. Although the
effectiveness of the juvenile court depends to a
very large degree upon the efficiency of its person-
nel, relatively few courts have staffs that are
especially qualified for their work. In most juvenile
courts the judges have been appointed or elected
on the basis of their general qualifications for
judicial work, and they divide their time between
adult and juvenile cases. Only in a very few
courts has the judge been selected because he has
some specialized training or experience in the
handling of children's problems. Often, however,
a referee is appointed to assist the judge in the
performance of his juvenile court duties. Although
considerable progress has been made in improving
the quality of probation in some parts of the
country, the great majority of courts are still
without the services of a sufficient number of well-
qualified and adequately paid workers. 38
Procedure of the Court. Police action initiates the
procedure in most delinquency cases, but often
it begins with action by a parent or other private
person or with a referral by a social agency or
another court. In recent years, about 50 percent
of the delinquency cases have been handled
informally or unofficially, that is, without an
official record or hearing, but with the judge or
someone else, such as a probation officer, taking
the necessary steps to dispose of the case. The
types of cases that are handled in this way vary
greatly from court to court, but the tendency
seems to be to reserve official hearings for older
children and those brought before the court on
serious charges.
When a case is handled officially, a petition
(which is merely a statement containing important
facts of the case, such as the names and addresses
of the child and his parents or guardian and the
cause of the action) is filed in the court, and the
case is then scheduled for a hearing. If the child
is not being held in detention and his presence is
required, a summons ordering him to appear, or
in some cases a warrant for his arrest, is issued.
3' SUSSMAN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 18, 19, 26-28.
38 Lenroot, op. cit. supra note 22, at 14, 15; Killian,
The Juvenile Court as an Institution, 261 ANNALS 92
(Jan. 1949); TEETERS & REINEuANN, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 313-19; TAPPAN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 13;




In most jurisdictions a prehearing investigation
is conducted so that both the hearing and the
disposition of the case can be based on the facts
so obtained. Some jurisdictions, however, require
that the child must be adjudged delinquent before
his case is investigated. In these jurisdictions the
hearing is held first, and if the child is found to be
delinquent, the court is adjourned, the investi-
gation is completed, and the information is then
used by the court in the disposition of the case.
Unfortunately, inadequacy of personnel and
excessive case loads often prevent the investi-
gation from being more than a superficial inquiry.
Juvenile court hearings are usually less formal
than trials in the criminal court, but the degree
of informality varies considerably throughout
the country. Privacy, however, characterizes most
hearings; only persons who are definitely con-
nected with the case are permitted to attend.
Seldom is a prosecuting attorney or a counsel for
the defense present during the hearing, and
although jury trials are permitted in many juris-
dictions, usually juries are not used. However,
the right of appeal in one form or another is
available in most jurisdictions.M
Disposition of Cases. After the hearing, the case
may be disposed of in one of several ways. The
case may be dismissed; a court order may be
issued stipulating that the child be examined and
treated by a physician, psychiatrist, or psy-
chologist or placed in a hospital or some other
institution or agency for whatever care may be
necessary; the child may be placed on probation
or in a foster home; or he may be committed to a
correctional institution. According to the United
States Children's Bureau, almost half of all
delinquency cases disposed of by the juvenile
courts during 1957 were dismissed, adjusted, or
held open without further hearing, and about
one-fourth were placed on probation.
40
Cooperation with Other Agencies. The success of
the juvenile court depends to a great extent upon
the work of other agencies, such as the police,
schools, clinics, churches, welfare organizations,
and correctional institutions, and it in turn can
39 SussmtAN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 29-37; NAT'L
CONF. ON PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY, REPORT ON JUVENILE COURT LAWS 6, 7
(Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office,
1947).
40 Sussu iN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 45-50; UNITED
STATES CHILDREN'S BUREAU, JUVENILE COURT STA-
TISTICS, 1957, 2 (Statistical Series, No. 52, 1959).
significantly contribute to the success of these
other agencies. It should be obvious, then, that
the court should play an important part in pro-
moting greater coordination among the law-
enforcement and welfare agencies of the com-
munity and in the establishment of a delinquency
prevention program. Some courts have coordinated
their work very closely with other agencies, but




CRITICISMS OF THE JUVENILE COURT
Ever since the juvenile court was established
over sixty years ago, it has been severely criticized
by both its friends and its enemies. 42 At first much
of the criticism questioned the constitutionality
of the court, but as one judicial decision after
another supported the court, the attack against
it shifted toward its modification or improvement.
In fact, today few critics would have the temerity
to advocate the abolition of the court, and it
seems, as Dr. William Healy has said, that "the
juvenile court is here to stay. 4 3 However, since so
many well informed persons have joined in the
criticism, several of the important questions
raised by them require our examination.
1. Has the juvenile court dealt effectively with
juvenile delinquency? This question is so complex
that perhaps any discussion of it can succeed in
only raising other perplexing questions. It is true
that various statistical attempts have been made
to evaluate the effectiveness of the juvenile
court. Several of these show that from about
one-fourth to over two-fifths of older juveniles
and adult offenders have previously been dealt
with by the court.44 Another study, made by the
Gluecks, revealed that 88.2 percent of the juveniles
included in their analysis again became delinquent
within five years after the end of their official
treatment by the juvenile court of Boston, and
41 Schramm, op. cit. supra note 27, at 104, 105; NATL
CONFERENCE ON PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF JUVE-
NILE DELINQUENCY, REPORT ON JUVENILE COURT AD-
MINISTRATION 18-20 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1947); BRECKINRIDGE, SOCIAL
WORK AND THE COURTS 231-40 (1934).
42 Much of the discussion of the criticisms of the
juvenile court presented here is an adaptation of that
contained in the author's text, CpIumuoLOGY, published
by the Ronald Press Co. in 1956. See pp. 370-78.
-3 Healy, Thoughts about Juvenile Courts, 13 FED.




that 70 percent of them were actually convicted
of serious offenses.
45
However, studies such as these have not been
conclusive. Not only have comparatively few
courts been carefully studied, but also the findings
of the investigations have not been consistent.
Besides, there are all kinds of juvenile courts,
many being such in name only, and an evaluation
of one is hardly a fair appraisal of others. Then,
too, the cases covered by the investigations often
do not constitute a representative sample of
those coming before the court, and the recidivism
noted is only that of which there is a record.
Actually no one knows how much undetected
delinquency and crime there is among those who
have been previously handled by the court.
Furthermore, the court is only one part of a very
complex culture, with which it is inextricably and
functionally related, and no one, therefore, knows
to what extent influences other than (and perhaps
even in spite of) that of the court caused the
improvement in those who subsequently did not
become recidivistic.
But suppose it could be proved that the juvenile
court has failed, should delinquents be tried in
the criminal court? Certainly no informed person
would be in favor of this. Is the solution, then,
"bigger and better" juvenile courts? To this
question no simple answer can be given. Most
counties have too few people to justify, others too
little wealth to afford, better juvenile courts.
Besides, large segments of our population are
already restive under the burden of heavy taxa-
tion. Should taxpayers be asked to contribute
more for the improvement of our juvenile courts?
Should some of the funds that are now being
spent for other purposes, for example, for the
operation of public schools, be diverted to the
development of the juvenile courts?48
But even the "biggest" and the "best" court
could do little to change the conditions that are
causing crime and delinquency. No systematic
science of human behavior exists, and the knowl-
edge that we do have requires the support of
public opinion if it is to be used most effectively.
Furthermore, how much judicial regulation will a
community tolerate? If a community is to preserve
certain rights and privileges, how much regulation
41 S. & E. GLuEcK, ONE TrousAND JUVENiLE DE-
LINQUENTS 167 (1934). For opposing views regarding
this study, see Sheldon Glueck's and Harry L. East-
man's articles in YEARBOOK, 1934, 63-103 (Nat'l Prob.
Ass'n, 1934).
48 CALDWELL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 371.
should it tolerate? Obviously, questions of this
kind can be considered only as they are related to
other values in our culture.
Still other questions must be raised. What is
meant by a "better" or the "best" juvenile court?
What criteria should be used to measure the
quality of a court? There is considerable dis-
agreement regarding these questions. Some claim
that the provisions of the Standard Juvenile Court
Act should be used as the criteria for evaluating
a juvenile court, but others would refuse to endorse
such a proposal. However, in spite of the fact that
so many difficulties interfere with attempts to
evaluate the effectiveness of the juvenile court,
certain steps can be taken now to improve the
quality of its work. Some of these will be mentioned
later in the discussion of the problems of the
court.
2. What types of cases should be handled by the
juvenile court? Like the first question, this one is
too broad to be examined thoroughly in an article
of this kind, but reference to a few specific situa-
tions will indicate why it has been raised.
After the juvenile court was established it
became the one agency in most communities which
could provide some kind of social service for the
increasing number of children who needed care
and protection, and so it tended to assume re-
sponsibility for a growing volume of cases. More-
over, this tendency was accelerated by the passage
of laws that stipulated that certain types of
children were to be cared for at public expense.
In general the court did not resist this tendency,
and in some communities court officials actually
encouraged it so that they might gain in power
and influence. And once the court had assumed
responsibility for certain cases, it tended to keep
this responsibility even after the need for doing
so had disappeared. As a result, the juvenile
court has become a catchall for a great variety of
cases requiring public attention.
As educational facilities and child welfare
services have developed throughout the country.
there has developed an increasing demand for the
transfer of certain cases from the jurisdiction of
the court to that of the schools and welfare
agencies. However, it is difficult to determine
just what criteria could be employed in dividing
the cases between the court and other agencies.
Some who speak for the welfare agencies say that
the juvenile court could exercise functions that
are primarily judicial and pertain to law-enforce-
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ment, while the welfare agencies could exercise
functions that are primarily administrative.4 But
this suggested standard is not sufficiently precise
to indicate exactly where the line is to be drawn.
Undoubtedly it would mean the transfer of many
neglect and dependency cases to welfare agencies,
but opponents have stressed the complexity of
the situation. Neglect, dependency, and delin-
quency are often interrelated, and delinquency
cases involve much administrative work. Besides,
many neglect and dependency cases require the
exercise of authority supported by the law. In
many instances only the court has sufficient
authority to enforce decisions and to protect the
rights of children and parents, and depriving the
court of its administrative duties would un-
necessarily complicate the handling of every
delinquency case.
The suggestion that certain cases, such as
truancy and incorrigibility, be transferred from
the juvenile court to the school has likewise
stirred up a controversy. Those in favor of the
transfer have argued that schools are in close
contact with children and their families, have a
great deal of information about them, and are
already doing a considerable amount of work with
them through the efforts of visiting teachers,
counselors, clinicians, and parent-teachers' associa-
tions; that children should not be exposed to
court experience, with its stigmatizing and trau-
matic implications, except as a last resort; and
that the schools would develop more effective
programs for the prevention of delinquency if
they were not permitted to shift so many of their
responsibilities to the court. On the other side
of the controversy, many have contended that
the personnel of the schools are already over-
worked and underpaid and should be relieved of
some of their responsibilities instead of being
given more; that schools do not have enough
authority to handle many of the cases; that the
stigma of a law-enforcement agency would be
attached to the schools if they had to handle
47 See, for example, Nutt, The Responsibility of the
Juvenile Court and the Public Welfare Agency in the
Child Welfare Program, YEARBOOK, 1947, 206 (Nat'l
Prob. and Parole Ass'n, 1948). See also, Nutt, The
Future of the Juvenile Court as a Case Work Agency,
YEARBOOK, 1939, 157 (Nat'l Prob. Ass'n, 1939); Nutt,
Juvenile Court Function, YEARBOOK, 1942, 94 (Nat'l
Prob. Ass'n, 1942); Geiser, The Court as a Case Work
Agency, YEA BooK, 1942, 105 (Nat'l Prob. Ass'n, 1942);
Mead, The Juvenile Court and Child Welfare Services,
YEARBOOK, 1947, 224 (Nat'l Prob. and Parole Ass'n,
1948).
delinquency cases; and that many children are
not attending school or are in private and parochial
schools and thus beyond the authority of public
educational officials.
Actually there is much merit in the arguments
on both sides of this controversy. Some of the
work of the court can be safely transferred to
educational and welfare agencies, but many
administrative duties must be retained by it.
Just where the line will be drawn will probably
have to be worked out on a local basis through
the judicious balancing of needs and resources and
the development of greater cooperation among
courts, schools, and welfare agencies.
4
Apart from this, however, other critics of the
court have insisted that older juveniles who
commit serious crimes, such as murder, man-
slaughter, rape, and robbery, should not be dealt
with in the juvenile court but should be tried in
the criminal court. In fact, many states have laws
giving the criminal court either original or ex-
clusive jurisdiction over such cases. Opponents
of this policy have branded it as reactionary and
in violation of the philosophy of the court. Ac-
cording to this philosophy, they explain, the court
should have exclusive jurisdiction over all children
requiring judicial action, should guide and protect
those who come before it, and should not stig-
matize or punish them or hold them up as examples
for others.
In reply to this argument, those who believe
that older juveniles charged with serious offenses
should be tried in the criminal court contend:
(1) that the upper age limit of children, especially
those charged with serious crimes, over whom the
juvenile court should have jurisdiction is a de-
batable subject; (2) that although the juvenile
court uses words like "guidance," "care," and
"protection," the fact is that it, too, resorts to
punitive methods in handling children; (3) that
the public, regardless of what the philosophy of
the court may be, looks upon the court as a place
48 Eliot, Case Work Functions and Judicial Func-
tions: Their Coordination, YEARBOOK, 1937, 252 (Nat'l
Prob. Ass'n, 1937); Pound, op. cit. supra note 3, at 14,
15; Schramm, The Juvenile Court Idea, 13 FED. PROB.
21 (Sept., 1949); CONTROLLING JuvEN I DELIN-
QUENCy (U. S. Children's Bureau Publication No. 301,
Washington, D. C.; U. S. Government Printing Office,
1943); Hyatt, The School, the Juvenile Court, and the
Social Attitude, YEARBOOK, 1931, 49 (Nat'l Prob.
Ass'n, 1931); Harper, School and Court Relationships
Concerning Behavior Problems, YEARBO0K, 1932 and
1933, 163 (Nat'l Prob. Ass'n, 1933); Taber, The Judge




where violators of the law are sentenced and
punished; (4) that one measure of the support
that courts and the law receive is the intensity
of the feeling that law-abiding citizens have
against law violators; and (5) that failure to
punish serious violators not only encourages others
to commit crimes but also discourages law-abiding
citizens from supporting law-enforcement agencies.
In this controversy, also, there is much to be
said in favor of both sides. Certainly no court can
exist apart from the community in which it
functions and to which it must look for support,
and to hold that the court should try to ignore
the deep feelings and strong desires of the people
whose values it is called upon to enforce is a
highly unrealistic and arbitrary attitude. It is
partly because of this fact that the Standard
Juvenile Court Act includes a provision that
juveniles sixteen years of age or older charged
with serious crimes may be tried in the criminal
court if the juvenile court deems this to be in the
best interest of the children and the public.
49
However, if the case of a youthful serious offender
is heard in a juvenile court, then this should be
done according to clearly defined rules of pro-
cedure, and he should be protected from arbitrary
action and abuse of authority just as the adult
felon is in the criminal court.
There has also been some recognition of the
limitations of the juvenile court for dealing with
older and more serious offenders in states where
the pressure has been to raise the upper age limit
of the court and to give it exclusive jurisdiction
over all children. For example, in California where
the court had exclusive jurisdiction to the age of
eighteen and concurrent jurisdiction to the age
of twenty-one, a special study commission in 1949
recommended that the juvenile court judge should
be required to decide specifically whether a
juvenile over sixteen charged with a crime could
be better handled by the juvenile court or by a
criminal court. °
3. Are the rights of the child and his parents pro-
tected in the juvenile court? As the juvenile court
has developed it has become increasingly domi-
nated by the ideas and methods of child welfare
and case work authorities. Contributing to this
tendency have been the occupancy of many
juvenile court positions by persons who have been
trained in social work or who are in agreement
19 A STANDARD JUVENILE COURT AcT, op. cit. supra
note 23, §13.
-1 TAPPAN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 8.
with its principles, the very infrequent presence
of attorneys in the court, the inadequate legal
training of many of its judges and referees, the
general exclusion of the public and the press from
its hearings, and the rarity of appeals from its
decisions. As a result of this departure of the
juvenile court from some of the most basic con-
cepts of justice in our culture, there has appeared
a growing controversy over whether the rights of
the child and his parents are being endangered by
the increase in the authority and administrative
functions of the court. 5' In this controversy,
criticism has been directed especially against (1)
broad definitions of delinquency, (2) unofficial
handling of cases, (3) prehearing investigations,
and (4) extreme informality of procedure.'
In general these aspects of the court have been
defended by the claim that they facilitate pre-
ventive and nonpunitive action by the court.
Thus advocates of a broad definition of delin-
quency contend that it permits the court to act
in situations which warrant its intervention with-
out becoming entangled in technical disputes over
the meaning of terms. In conformance with this
point of view, some states have broadened the
definition of delinquency by substituting a few
general categories of delinquency for a number of
specifically defined acts. The laws of some other
states and the Standard Juvenile Court Act53 have
gone beyond this and do not define delinquency
at all. Instead, without using the term delin-
quency, they merely describe certain situations
and classifications of children over which the
court has jurisdiction. This avoidance of the
11 Id. at 2. Administrative functions of the court in-
clude such activities as investigation of cases, planning
for the care of children, supervision of probationers, and
foster-home placement. These are to be contrasted with
the court's judicial functions, which refer to such mat-
ters as adoption and guardianship and decisions re-
garding custody and commitment.
52See TAPPAN, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 195-223
(1949); Schramm, op. cit. supra note 48, at 19-23;
Pound, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1-22; Waite, How Far
Can Court Procedure Be Socialized without Impairing
Individual Rights? 12 J. Cgim. L.& C. 339 (1921);
Rubin, Protecting The Child in the Juvenile Court, 43
J. CRim. L., C.&P.S. 425 (1952); KAHN, op. cit. supra
note 35, at 95-135; Nunberg, Problems in the Structure
of the Juvenile Court, 48 J. CRam. L., C.&P.S. 500
(1958); Herman, Scope and Purposes of Juvenile Court
Jurisdiction, 48 J. Cirm. L., C.&P.S. 590 (1958);
Diana, The Rights of Juvenile Delinquents: An Ap-
praisal of Juvenile Court Procedure, 47 J. CRm. L.,
C.&P.S. 561 (1957); Allen, The Borderland of the
Criminal Law: Problems of "Socializing" Criminal Jus-
tice, 32 Soc. SERv. REv. 107 (1958).
1
3 A STANDARD JUVENILE COURT AcT, op. Cit. supra
note 23, at 8.
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"delinquency tag," it is argued, enables the court
to help and protect the child without stigmatizing
him in any way. The unofficial handling of cases
has been justified on the grounds that official
court action is not needed in many situations, that
it enables the court to assist children who, al-
though not yet within its jurisdiction, are in
danger of becoming so, and that the official label
of delinquency should be avoided as much as
possible. Prehearing investigations should be
used, it is asserted, because they provide important
facts for the hearings and thus allow the hearings
themselves to be utilized as part of the treatment
process. Extreme informality of procedure is
favored by those who believe that only by mini-
mizing all rules can the philosophy of the juvenile
court gain full expression. They maintain that
rules are not important anyway since the state is
not bringing action against a defendant, as it
would in a criminal trial, but is rather acting as a
guardian of the child, and that therefore we need
not be concerned about protecting the child from
possible harm.
However, a number of important points have
been stressed on the other side of the controversy,
and an examination will now be made of some of
these. Broad definitions of delinquency and the
unofficial handling of cases,. it is contended,
channel an increasing number of children not
having serious problems into courts which, by
general admission, are overloaded, understaffed,
and inadequately equipped for preventive work.
Handling by thesc c-urts not only gives such
children the appearance of being seriously de-
linquent in the eyes of the public, and thus actually
defeats the alleged purpose of this practice, but
also exposes them to the danger of being treated
as if they were serious delinquents or, what is
worse, of being indiscriminately committed to
correctional institutions when perhaps they are
suffering only from neglect or dependency. More-
over, even when the court can engage in extensive
preventive work, this activity may discourage the
development of other agencies better organized
and equipped to do this work.
Besides, it is argued, where is the child who does
not have a problem? With little effort hundreds
of children who have problems can be found in
any community and brought into court. And if
the court is not vigilant, it may be used by parents
as a weapon against children in stituations where
the parents themselves are to blame. Thus the
amily is given a crutch at a time when it should
be encouraged to strengthen itself through its
own efforts-and other agencies can assist the
family to do this far more effectively than can the
court.
Furthermore, it is asserted, the situation is not
improved by the use of the prehearing investi-
gation. Too often this tends to become the hearing
itself-a process during which the facts are
gathered and the decision regarding disposition is
reached even before the court has determined
whether the child is delinquent. Indeed, his mere
presence in court may be interpreted as pre-
sumptive evidence of his delinquency, and this
may be easily inflated to conclusive evidence if
some personal problem in his history can be
discovered and dilated upon by the probation
officer. If the hearing has been conducted with an
extremely informal procedure, the child will find
that the decision can be overturned only with
great difficulty. If, as its advocates claim, the
prehearing investigation is not to be used to
acquire evidence against the child, then there is
no sound reason why the investigation should not
be postponed until after the child has been ad-
judged delinquent. Here another point needs to
be stressed. The court cannot be certain that a
problem child will become a delinquent child, and
besides, its own ineptitude may convert a problem
into delinquency.
Moreover, it is urged, the rights of the child
and his parents are especially endangered if the
case is handled with extreme informality, because
then there is no attorney to guard against the
abuse of authority, no set of rules to ward off
hearsay and gossip, no way of breaking through
the secrecy of the hearing, and often no appeal
from the court's decision. The child and his
parents have even less protection if the case is
handled unofficially, for in such a procedure very
few legal checks limit the court's discretion, and
redress at law becomes difficult since no official
record exists upon which the child can plead his
case. The situation can be worse if broad defini-
tions of delinquency are used, because these leave
the term vague and fuzzy, and under them all
children tend to be pooled indiscriminately as
wards of the state without an opportunity to
marshal evidence against a specific charge. If these
children are then processed through unofficial
handling or informal hearings from which many,
if not most, of the limitations of due process have
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been removed, they are largely at the court's
discretion, which too frequently may be only the
expression of the judge's prejudice. How ironical
it is that this situation is justified in the name of
equity, especially since the court of equity has
always had its rules and formality for the same
reason that rules and formality should be present
in the juvenile court, that is, to check the abuse
of power and to protect the rights of the individual.
Finally, it is protested, euphemistic terminology,
such as "hearing" instead of "trial," or "dis-
position" instead of "sentence," should not be
allowed to conceal the fact that the nature of the
entire procedure in the juvenile court may be
little different from that of a criminal court. In
fact, it may be worse, for it may abandon the
principles upon which justice is based under the
guise of promoting a superior justice. It is under-
standable, therefore, why Carr has said, "No man
is wise enough or good enough to be trusted with
arbitrary power-even the arbitrary power to
prejudge the case of some delinquent child in the
juvenile court.""
These, then, are some of the points that have
been stressed by those who are opposed to broad
definitions of delinquency, unofficial handling of
cases, prehearing investigations, and extreme
informality of procedure. That they are impressive
ones is evidenced by the fact that an increasing
number of thoughtful writers have demanded
greater protection for the child and his parents
in the juvenile court. And Tappan, in dismay
over the seriousness of the situation, has asked,
"Who is to save the child from his saviors?" 55
This analysis of the criticisms of the juvenile
court clearly shows that we are dealing with
questions of emphasis and fine distinctions in a
process which involves the balancing of the best
interests of both the individual and society. It
also indicates some of the social, philosophical,
legal, and operational problems that confront the
juvenile court. In the consideration of these
problems, we shall be able to maintain a better
sense of proportion if we remember these facts:
(1) Although the general tendency has been
toward the operation of the juvenile court as an
administrative agency with great emphasis on
social service functions, this type of operation has
not been achieved to any great extent except in
the comparatively few highly-organized, inde-
CARR, DELINQUENCY CONTROL 240 (1950).
1- TAPPAN, op. cit. supra note 52, at 208.
pendent courts in our large cities; but, it must be
added, these courts have been exerting a dis-
proportionate influence in the establishment of
standards and goals in the juvenile court move-
ment. (2) Many courts, instead of taking action
themselves, are already referring a large number
of cases to schools and welfare agencies. (3) Many
courts that have few of the essential characteristics
of the juvenile court sre nevertheless effectively
handling cases because of the wisdom of the
judge and the support of interested citizens.
(4) Many courts, regardless of what can be done
in their behalf, will remain "substandard courts"
even when measured by the most moderate
criteria-a fact which becomes increasingly
apparent since these courts have shown little
improvement despite the unprecedented pros-
perity of this country. (5) Many communities
will have to continue to send their neglect and
dependency cases and some of their truancy
cases to the juvenile court simply because they
do not now have, and may never have, any other
agency able to assume this responsibility. (6) The
majority of the alleged delinquents appearing in
the juvenile court do not contest the allegations
brought against them and are actually delinquent,
although, of course, this does not mean that these
children are not entitled to all necessary legal
protection.
Since the juvenile court in the United States is
a functioning part of an increasingly complex
culture, it must share in all the social problems,
including delinquency, that this type of society
tends to produce. To the extent that the juvenile
court operates effectively to rehabilitate juvenile
offenders and to deter others from becoming
delinquent, it functions as an agency of prevention
and contributes somewhat to social reorganization.
But obviously it can remove only some of the
conditions that are causing the delinquency with
which it is dealing, and it has virtually no control
over industrialization, urbanization, and other
such powerful forces that are transforming and
disorganizing American society-including the
juvenile court itself-and piling up social problems
faster than we can handle them.
Although there has been considerable debate
about how the juvenile courts can improve their
staffs, lower their case loads, and reduce their
other operational problems, most students of the
court agree that certain changes can be made
now to accomplish these objectives. Many com-
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munities can and should spend more money on
their courts, and others should use their present
expenditures more effectively. Many courts should
have judges who are better trained in both the
law and the social sciences, larger jurisdictional
areas, and a stronger position in their state's
judicial system.56 All courts should closely co-
ordinate their operations with those of welfare and
law-enforcement agencies. And everywhere the
public should be told more about the court and
encouraged to support its work.
It is recognized, of course, that all the problems
,of the court are interrelated and interacting and
that many of them are beyond its control. How-
ever, there are major problems of a philosophical
and legal nature with which the court can deal
directly and which are contributing materially to
its operational difficulties. The juvenile court, like
all courts, must try to balance the interests of the
individual and society in the adjudication of its
cases. In the United States social relationships are
being torn apart by conflicts, and agencies of
social control subverted by divisive influences.
The ensuing confusion is blurring the sense of
right and wrong, diluting basic loyalties, en-
dangering many cherished rights, and sweeping
away duties and responsibilities essential for the
security of the community. The juvenile court
can help to reduce this confusion if its philo-
sophical and legal foundations are strengthened.
The proposals advanced below are designed to do
this by casting the court in a more realistic role,
protecting the rights and clarifying the duties of
those coming before it, and enabling it to effect
a better balance between the rights of the child
and his parents and the security of the community.
PROPOSALS REGARDING THE COURT's PHILOSOPHY
AND LEGAL BASIS
Philosophy of the Court. The roots of most of the
controversy over the juvenile court are to be
found in the dual role that it plays in attempting
to function both as a court of law and as a social
service agency. In fact, many writers on the
subject believe that the basic problem confronting
56 The way in which the position of the juvenile court
in the state's judicial system is to be strengthened will
be affected by the surrounding social and political con-
ditions. According to the Standard Juvenile Court Act,
if the court is not part of a state system of juvenile
courts, it should be set up within the existing judicial
structure as a separate division at the level of the high-
est court of general trial jurisdiction. SussmAx, op. cit.
supra note 4, at vii. See also Rubin, State Juvenile
Court: A New Standard, 30 Focus 103 (July, 1951).
the court involves a decision as to which of its
two functions, the legal or the social service, is to
predominate5
The juvenile court was established as a court,
albeit a special one, and in structure, function, and
procedure it remains essentially a court.5" There-
fore efforts should be made to strengthen its
true, or judicial, nature and to retain and develop
only that part of its social service function that
is necessary for the administration of individual-
ized justice.
As a court, even in the administration of this
type of justice, it must not only express the values
of the society in which it functions but also rein-
force these values. Dean Pound, a friend of the
juvenile court, clearly recognized this when he
said:
"If we work out a system of making penal
treatment fit the crime, we risk losing sight of
the individual delinquent in pursuit of system.
If we look only at the individual delinquent,
we risk losing system in pursuit of individual
treatment and lose objectivity which is de-
manded when we are constraining the indi-
vidual by the force of politically organized
society. It comes down to the reconciling of the
general security with the individual life, which
as I have said, is a fundamental problem of the
whole legal order."w
In other words, no court, not even the juvenile
court, can be just a therapeutic agency. It is, and
must be, a moral agency as well. And when a
child is adjudicated a delinquent by the court,
he is, and of necessity must be, stigmatized as a
violator of the moral values of his society. This is
what the people want and expect of any agency
such as a court which is established to protect
and strengthen their values. In fact, the court
must act in this way if it is to promote the re-
habilitation of the child. If it did otherwise, it
would flaunt the very values to which the child
must learn to adjust and for which he must
develop a loyalty. This is not to ignore the fact
-7 See for example, Baker, The Functions of the Ju-
venile Court, 24 Case and Com. 449 (Nov. 1917); Long,
The Juvenile Court and Community Resources, YEAR-
BooK, 1940, 24 (Nat'l Prob. Ass'n, 1940); Eastman &
Cousins, Juvenile Court and Welfare Agency: Their
Division of Function, 38 A.B.A.J. 575-77, 623 (1952);
Nunberg, op. cit. supra note 52, at 500.
58 Both legal scholars and social welfare authorities
have recognized this fact. See, for example, Pound, op.
cit. supra note 3, at 5; Nutt, op. cit. supra note 47, at
212.
59 Pound, op. cit. supra note 4, at 15.
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that values change and that considerable con-
fusion regarding moral standards exists in the
United States. The point is that the court cannot
avoid its responsibility as a moral agency. Iti
must do what it can to reduce this confusion. It
must devote itself to the interests of the delinquent
and respect his rights, but it must also take its
stand with the community and insist that he
learn to discharge his duties and assume his
responsibilities as a member of society, thus
giving encouragement and support to lawabiding
citizens and helping to maintain the public sense
of justice. The way in which the court does this
will, of course, depend upon the facts of the case
as they are revealed and evaluated in the process
of "individualized justice."
Furthermore, in the disposition of the delin-
quency case the court forces the child to submit
to its authority by placing him on probation, by
committing him to a correctional institution, or
by dealing with him in some other similar way.
And by no stretch of the imagination can what
actually happens to the child during this process
be called merely treatment. Thus the action of the
court involves both community condemnation of
antisocial conduct and the imposition of un-
pleasant consequences by political authority-the
two essential elements of punishment. ®0 It is,
therefore, highly unrealistic to say that the court
treats, but does not punish, the child. What it
really does is to emphasize treatment in a cor-
rectional process which includes, and of necessity
must include, both treatment and punishment.
This conclusion tends to be supported by several
other facts. There is no systematic science of
human behavior, and the concepts and techniques
of treatment are still largely inadequate. More-
over, as Dunham has explained, neither the child
nor his parents are inclined to view his behavior
as symptomatic of a sickness that needs treat-
ment, but instead "are committed to the view
that the court is there for justice and for punishing
a person who has done something that is wrong." 6' 1
Besides, the stipulation that the court should act
as a parent in protecting and caring for the child
does not rule out the necessity and desirability of
punishment. Here again Dean Pound had a clear
understanding of the nature of the court. "Juvenile
60 Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw AND
CONTEM. PROB. 401 (1958).
61 Dunham, The Juvenile Court: Contradictory Orien-
tations in Processing Offenders, 23 LAW AN) CONTEMP.
PROB. 520 (1958).
probation," he said, "is not a mode of penal treat-
ment nor a substitute for punishment. It is a mode
of exercising the authority of the state as parens
patriae. It may be conceded that the parent may
have at times to administer what common law
called reasonable correction to the child. No doubt
there is often a corrective element in judicial
treatment of juvenile offenders. But the spirit is
that of the parent rather than that of the ruler." ''
This modification of the philosophy of the
juvenile court is superior to that generally ac-
cepted in several important respects. First, it
clearly recognizes the necessity of balancing the
interests of the delinquent and the community in
the process of "individualized justice." Second,
it provides a practical basis of action which can
be accepted without conflict by both law-in-
forcement officers and court personnel. Third, by
honestly admitting that the court must not only
treat but also punish, this modified philosophy
dispels the cloud of hypocrisy now enveloping the
juvenile court, and gives it a position in society
where it can be respected by all law-abiding
citizens. Finally, by revealing the true nature of
the court, this modified philosophy brings the
possibility of the abuse of power out into the open
where it can be clearly understood and effectively
controlled.
Jurisdiction of the Court. The jurisdiction of the
juvenile court should be limited to (1) delinquency
cases, and (2) those dependency and neglect cases
in which a decision must be made affecting the
legal status of the child, his custody, or the rights
of his parents. All other dependency and neglect
cases should be handled by administrative agencies
without court action, and truancy should be
dealt with by the schools. 3 This proposal is made
in recognition of the fact that the juvenile court
is essentially a court and not an administrative
agency, and that, therefore, it suffers from in-
herent limitations in welfare work. Furthermore,
the considerable increase in the number of welfare
agencies and public services during the past few
decades not only makes this transfer of responsi-
bilities possible but also leaves the court with a
greater capacity to handle the growing volume of
delinquency cases.
6 Pound, op. cit. supra note 4, at 16.
63 This is essentially the proposal made by SOL RuBiN
in his book, CRIVA AND JUVENILE DELINQUENcY 60-63
(1958). See also Nutt, op cit. supra note 47, at 213;
Hanna, Dependency and Neglect Cases in the Juvenile
Court, YEARBOOK, 1941, 136 (Nat'l Prob. Ass'n, 1941).
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The court should deal with children who can be
shown to be delinquent by the application of
specific, sharply defined criteria, and not with
children who have problems according to the
opinions of teachers, clergymen, and social workers
-however sincere these beliefs may be. Juvenile
delinquency, therefore, should be defined as the
violation of a state law or city or town ordinance
by a child whose act if committed by an adult
would be a crime. This simple, specific definition
eliminates all the references to such vague con-
ditions as "being ungovernable" or "growing up
in idleness" which clutter up our statutes on
delinquency and invite loose interpretation and
abuse of authority. Thus it will prevent the
juvenile court from moving into areas where other
agencies can render more effective service, and at
the same time it will protect children and their
parents from indiscriminate handling by the
court without regard for the cause of action in the
case.
The juvenile court should have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all children between
the ages of seven and eighteen who are alleged to
be delinquent, except in cases where a child is
charged with a minor traffic offense or where a
child of sixteen or over is charged with a serious
felony, such as murder, armed robbery, or rape.
In the cases involving minor traffic offenses, there
is no need of special handling. They can be ad-
equately dealt with by a police or traffic court,
and thus the burden on the juvenile court can be
reduced. 64 In the cases where children sixteen or
over are charged with serious felonies the criminal
court should have original jurisdiction but with
authority to transfer such cases to the juvenile
court if in the opinion of the judge this would be
in the best interests of both the child and the
community. The criminal court should have the
authority to act first in these cases, because it,
more than the juvenile court, is held responsible
for the security of society and is organized and
administered esp"cially for this purpose. As
Ludwig has emphasized, "Making treatment of
all criminal behavior of young offenders, regardless
of its seriousness or triviality, depend solely upon
the individual need of the offender for rehabilita-
tion may well lead our impressionable young
community to conclude that fracturing someone's
skull is no more immoral than fracturing his
64 See STANDARDS FOR SPECIALIZED CouRTs DEALING
WITH CHILDREN, op. cit. supra note 24, at 29, 30.
bedroom window."65 This point is particularly
important since a large and increasing percentage
of serious crimes are being committed by young
people. Thus the handling of a large percentage of
these young offenders in the juvenile court-a
court Which is not primarily concerned with the
public sense of justice and security-will make the
criminal law increasingly inoperative and cause
additional confusion regarding our code of morality
and the importance of vigorous law enforcement.
This in turn may contribute to the growth of
indifference and cynicism regarding the duties and
responsibilities of citizenship and to an already
alarming trend toward the centralization of power
in the hands of a few who, under the guise of
science and treatment, often seek to impose their
own values upon an increasingly disorganized
people. To make matters worse, what is hailed as
humanitarianism is frequently just public in-
difference regarding the way in which delinquents
and criminals are handled.
The case of an adult charged with an offense
against a child should be handled not in the
juvenile court but in the criminal court. This will
place these cases in a court better designed to
assure protection of all fundamental rights in a
criminal proceedingO and will help the public to
understand that the juvenile court is a special
court for children and not in any sense of the
word a criminal court.
Procedure of the Court. Through its intake pro-
cedure the juvenile court should carefully screen
all cases brought to its attention so as to eliminate
those that do not require the attention of the
court or any other agency and to insure the
referral of as many other cases as possible to
agencies that are better equipped than the court
to provide curative and preventive treatment.
The cases that are accepted by the court should
receive official handling. If a case is not in need of
official handling, it should not be handled by the
court at all, but should be referred to some other
agency. Too often unofficial handling is merely
the haphazard, ineffective disposition of cases by
understaffed, overloaded courts, which is justified
under the guise of avoiding the "delinquency
ta g . ,,3 7
6 5 LUDWiG, op. cit. supra note 20, at 311.
66 Id. at 151.67 Tappan, Unofficial Delinquency, 29 NEB. L. REv.
547 (1950); Herman, op. cit. supra note 52, at 596;
SussmxAN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 29, 30; RunrN, op.
cit. supra note 63, at 66-68; STANDARDS FOR SPECIAL-
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The court should establish the fact of delin-
quency in a case before an investigation of the
case is made. Prehearing investigations are not
only an encroachment upon the rights of the child
who has not yet been proved delinquent, but are
costly in time, energy, and money in the cases of
those who are discharged as not delinquent.
The procedure during the hearing should be
informal but based upon sufficient rules to insure
justice and consistency. The child and his parents
should be fully informed regarding their legal
rights. These should include the right to be repre-
sented by counsel, to have a clear explanation of
the allegations against the child, to cross-examine
hostile witnesses, to summon witnesses in the
child's defense, to have protection against ir-
relevant and hearsay testimony and compulsory
self-incrimination, to have a hearing before a jury
if this is desired, to have proof of delinquency by
at least a preponderance of convincing evidence,
and to have access to a higher court for the purpose
of an appeal. In addition, every juvenile before
the court should be given the opportunity to have
a public hearing if he so desires, and if he prefers
a private one, members of the press should be
admitted to the hearing but should not be per-
nitted to publish the name of the child or any
identifying data regarding him without the
permission of the court. Their mere presence,
however, should exert a wholesome and restraining
influence on the court's operations. 8
Disposition of Cases. The disposition of the case
should be made by the judge after a study of the
investigation report and consultation with the
probation officer and other specialists who have
worked on the case. However, simply because the
judge must turn to specialists for assistance in his
disposition of the case does not mean that it
might be better to have the disposition made
entirely by a panel bf "experts." In the first place
this incorrectly suggests that there is a type of
knowledge that the judge does not have, cannot
understand, and can never acquire. This not only
grossly exaggerates the amount of knowledge we
now have regarding human behavior but also
greatly underestimates the intelligence and skill
of the majority of our judges. If a particular judge
IZED CoURTs DEALING WITH CHILDREN, Op. Cit. supra
note 24, at 43-45.
68 Tappan, Treatment without Trial, 24 Social Forces
308 (March 1946); Cappello, Due Process in the Ju-
ienile Court, 2 CATHOLIc U. L. REv. 90 (1952); Geis,
Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 30 RocKY MT.
L. RE v. 101 (1958).
is so incompetent or stubborn that he cannot, or
will not, benefit by having the assistance of
specialists, then the solution lies in his removal
from office, not in unnecessarily complicating the
machinery of the court by the creation of a panel
of "experts." And if the judge is so overworked
that he does not have time to analyze carefully
the facts contained in the investigation report and
to consult with specialists about the various
aspects of the case, then the answer is to be found
in the appointment of more judges. There is no
short cut or cheap way to "individualized justice,"
and the mere existence of a juvenile court does
not insure its achievement.
Furthermore, the facts of adjudication and
disposition cannot be examined as if they existed
apart from each other. These facts exist in the
life of a single child who must be seen in his
entirety-developing from what he was to what
he will be. They must be assembled creatively in
the mind of one person who has the authority to
balance the interests of both the individual and
the community and who is held responsible by
the community for this function. The facts of a
case can be seen in a variety of ways, depending
upon the relation of the examiner to the facts,
and the mind is easily misled into seeing only one
side of this picture. The judge who decides that
a child is a delinquent should make this decision
to intervene in the child's life not only in full
knowledge of what will happen to the child as he
is subjected to the available social services but
also in deep awareness of being held responsible
for the entire procedure. Only in such a process of
sober deliberation can the knowledge of the facts
be creatively transformed into a wise decision.
The division of authority among the members of a
panel fragmentizes the facts of the case and
dilutes the sense of responsibility regarding the
interests of the child and his relationship to the
community.6
These proposals are not advanced with any
desire to convert the juvenile court into a criminal
court but rather with full recognition of both its
great potentialities and its inherent limitations.
The juvenile court must be seen as a court-not
as an administrative agency, but as a court-
designed to protect the child from the traumatic
experiences of a criminal trial and to provide more
69 KAaN, op. cit. supra note 35, at 277; Hall, The
Youth Correction Authority Act, Progress or Menace? 28




flexible machinery for balancing the interests of
the child and the community in the light of the
most recent knowledge regarding human behavior.
It is not, however, especially equipped to do
welfare work, and so wherever possible it should
be divested of jurisdiction over cases in which the
child is simply in need of aid. On the other hand,
it is a court, and its action does necessarily stig-
matize the child. Therefore, its jurisdiction and
procedure should be governed by simple, specific
rules so that while the child is receiving guidance
and protection, his rights and the security of the
community are not neglected.
The foregoing proposals have sought to strip
away those excrescenses that have interfered
with the expression of the true nature of the
juvenile court, but they have left it with all the
characteristics which are essential to its func-
tioning and growth. Delinquency as a status
different from that of crime, judges carefully
selected on the basis of both their legal and social
science training and knowledge, separate hearings
as informal and private as are consistent with the
protection of rights, availability of resources, such
as medical, psychological, and psychiatric services,
that can be used to make the investigation of
cases more effective, regular probation service by
an adequate number of well-trained officers,
separate detention of children, special and con-
fidential court and probation records-all these
and more remain intact and are given a deeper
meaning by a more realistic philosophy.
It is recognized that not all these proposals can
immediately be put into effect everywhere. It is
believed, however, that they do represent desirable
goals toward which all juvenile courts should be
directed so that they will become more effective
agencies of social control.
But, as Dean Pound wisely counseled, "the law
is not equal to the whole task of social control.
Delinquency presents a problem far too complex
to be dealt with by any single method. Hence in
this field cooperation is peculiarly called for and is
called for in a very wide field. If a socialized
criminal justice is to achieve all that it may, we
must be thinking about more than cooperation of
judge and probation officer and social worker.
These must cooperate, or at least be prepared to
cooperate with the community organizer, the
social engineer, the progressive educator, the
social coordinator, the health officer, the clergy-
man, and the public-spirited promoter of legisla-
tion."70
-0 Pound, op. cit. supra note 4, at 13, 14.
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